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Abstract 
Many resources such as supercomputers, legal advisors, and university classrooms are 
shared by many members of an organization. When the supply of shared resources is 
limited, conflict usually results between contending demanders. If these conflicts can be
adequately resolved, then value is created for the organization. In this paper we use the 
methodology of applied mechanism design to examine alternative processes for the 
resolution of such conflicts for a particular class of scheduling problems. We construct a 
laboratory environment, within which we evaluate the outcomes of various allocation 
mechanisms. In particular, we are able to measure efficiency, the value attained by the 
resulting allocations as a percentage of the maximum possible value. Our choice of 
environment and parameters is guided by a specific application, the allocation of time on 
NASA's Deep Space Network, but the results also provide insights relevant to other 
scheduling and allocation applications. We find (1) experienced user committees using
decision support algorithms produce reasonably efficient allocations in lower conflict 
situations but perform badly when there is a high level of conflict between demanders, (2) 
there is a mechanism, called the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) which 
charges users for time, which yields high efficiencies in high conflict situations but because 
of the prices paid, the net surplus available to the users is less than that resulting from the 
inefficient user committee (a reason why users may not appreciate "market solutions" to 
organization problems) and (3) there is a modification of AUSM in which tokens, or
internal money, replaces real money, which results in highly efficient allocations without 
extracting any of the users' surplus. Although the distribution of surplus is still an issue, 
the significant increase in efficiency provides users with a strong incentive to replace 
inefficient user committees with the more efficient AUSM. 
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1 Introduction 
Typically, shared resources are centrally financed and managed by an or­
ganization and used in various ways and intensities by diverse members of 
that organization. Examples of such resources include supercomputers, ob­
servatories, motor pools, legal advisors, lab facilities, etc. The methods and 
processes by which shared resources arc allocated often evolve in a common 
pattern. We offer our stylized version here. 1 In the beginning, the re­
source is proposed by potential users, designed by engineers, and financed 
and managed by bureaucrats. Many of these actors have a political stake 
in the performance nnd utility of the resources: thus, they want to keep 
control. The ini tial management structure is often a combination of user 
committees and bureaucratic responsibility. As long as desired use is not 
'The authors thank the Implementation Development Office of the Jct Propulsion 
Laboratory of NASA for their finundal support. 
1For a more extensive review of management app1·oachcs sec Ostrom (1990). 
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much larger than capacity, committee meetings and bureaucratic negotia­
tion can usually overcome what little conflicts may arise in determining who 
gets what use of the shared facility. However, increases in demand or de­
creases in usable capacity can easily lead to congestion in the system and to 
contentious non-negotiable conflicts among users. If it is not possible, or is 
costly to expand the resources, the next step usually involves asking users 
and bureaucrats to streamline their decision processes. Decision Support 
Teams are often summoned to help facilitate the process. They provide com­
puter programs (sometimes involving various voting mechanisms) which are 
intended to speed up the existing processes. Using valuation and resource 
requirement information provided by the users, the algorithms may heuris­
tically solve very complex optimization problems in an attempt to compute 
good allocations. Unfortunately, these support programs tend to ignore the 
fact that users have incentives to bias the information they provide to the 
algorithm in order to achieve more favorable allocations. The new support 
systems work faster but congestion remains as much of a problem as before. 
Value is foregone. 
At this point, in desperation, economists are sometimes called for advice. 
Their usual response is "auction it off" or "price it at marginal cost", forget­
ting at least two facts that lead users to ignore the economists' advice. First, 
users who have been getting something for nothing will now have to pay to 
obtain an allocation. Thus, even if allocative efficiency improves and value 
increases, the users can be worse off because the bureaucracy may capture­
more in rents than the increase in the value of the allocations. So the users 
will use whatever political clout they have to block these "economic solu­
tions". Second, even if the political resistance can be overcome, for example 
by the use of grandfathered allocations2, these scheduling problems can in­
volve significant non-convexities which cause prices to be unable to function 
as coordinating devices. Thus even if the economists' advice is taken se­
riously, the results may he less than satisfactory and yield allocations no 
better for users than current processes are producing (see Banks, Ledyard 
and Porter ( 1989)).
In this paper we explore a different approach to finding solutions for con­
gestion in shared resources: applied ·mechanisni design. (See Ledyard (1993) 
2An interesting example of this can be found in Riker and Sened (1991) based on work 
of Grether, Isaac and Plott (1981). 
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for a summary of the approach. ) \Ve argue that new processes can be de­
signed which improve on congested user committees or other regulatory ad­
ministrative procedures. The constraints on the design process, in addition 
to those familiar to economists such as .incentive compatibility and budget 
balancing, include limits on the computational capability of any algorithm 
used and political constraints which must be satisfied if the mechanism is to 
be acceptable to the parties involved as a replacement to current procedures. 
This approach to the design of new mechanisms is ideally pursued by the 
combination of theorists, who can analyze some of the properties of an allo­
cation mechanism, and experimental economists, who use the laboratory to 
test the performance and refine the procedures for demonstration and actual 
use. When theoretical knowledge is not sufficient to describe the behavior of 
individuals in a mechanism in the environment under study, the economist 
can still create new mechanisms, the choice guided by theoretical intuition 
and previous empirical evidence from other environments. The laboratory 
can then be used to test and improve the performance of the new mechanism 
in an environment based on the field application of interest. This approach 
to design is similar in spirit to the aircraft designer who uses wind tunnels 
to create new airplanes. 
In this paper, we report the results from a set of experiments designed 
to provide a testbed and a demonstration of proof of concept. We based our 
experiments on a systematic study of a specific shared resource problem, the 
allocation of tracking time of NASA's worldwide Deep Space Network (DSN}-­
of antennas. While one may or may not be interested in the DSN allocation 
problem, the approach we take and the results of our performance tests have 
a wide range of application to scheduling and other allocation problems. 
Our approach is straightforward to replicate. We first try to extract 
those elements of the situation that are most relevant to the mechanism 
design problem. For the DSN problem, we report this aspect of our research 
in sections 2 and 3 below. Using these historical and theoretical analyses,
we then create a class of environments, our wind tunnel parameters, within
which to test various orga11iu1.tion designs. Next, wo try to construct an
experimentally testable version of the current process as a benchmark against 
which to test new designs. Then we create, being guided by relevant theory 
and experimental evidence, new· mechanisms which we think will solve the 
allocation problem. Finally, we test the mechanisms in the environments. At 
this point we can eliminate designs with obviously poor performance and can 
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fine tune the procedures (including stopping rules, information structures, 
etc.) that seem promising. The results of this experimental analysis are 
contained in Section 6. We conclude with a summary of lessons learned. 
We turn now to the details. 
2 A Little Background 
The Deep Space Network is a worldwide network of antennas managed by the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for NASA. The network is used to provide 
uplink and downlink communication with spacecraft in deep space. There 
are currently 10 flight projects in deep space using the network, 4 ground 
based radio/radar astronomy projects and maintenance activities, 3 planned 
missions, and 5 pre-planning stage missions which will require use of the 
antennas. The antennas arc located at three different locations which allows 
for continuous tracking of a spacecraft and there are three types of antennas 
(34 meter High Efficiency, 34 meter beam waveguide, and 70 meter) at each
location. Each antenna may he directed to at most one user at a time. 
Demand varies greatly among users and across their lifetimes. For example, 
the Voyager and Pioneer missions are over 15 years old, have completed 
their prime missions, and are now in an extended mission mode at the outer 
reaches of our solar system; on the other hand, the Galileo mission to Jupiter 
and Ulysses solar polar mission are still en route to their prime targets. In 
addition, demands are interrelated since the goal of the organization is overall 
mission success. Therefore, scheduling in this environment is a very dynamic 
process. 
Scheduling of the antenna time has been facilitated by the use of a deci­
sion support system and a series of user committees. There are currently the 
equivalent of 15 full time employees involved in constructing and updating 
time schedules, which tentatively assign each antenna beginning ten years 
in advance. For two years in advance, detailed minute by minute sched­
ules are provided which can be edited until the date scheduled. Heuristic 
look ahead algorithms help with the provision of initial schedules and aid
long-term planning. However, despite t.he amount of resources used in the
scheduling process, there remains widespread contention for resources and
significant amounts of c�rnmittce t.ime used to resolve schedule conflicts. Re­
cently, some effort has been made t.o commit to resource "allocations" early
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so that projects can plan early. However, there is still an oversubscription of 
resources and changes arc commonplace. Below we provide a. simple flowchart
of the current committee allocation process. 
[Figure l. a.bout here ] 
3 A Theoretical Framework 
The DSN is an example of a shared resource. The abstract structure of the 
allocation problem associated with shared resources is very straight-forward. 
There is a set, X, of resources to be allocated. Examples include time on
an antenna, a computer memory, volume in the bay of a space shuttle, time 
with a consultant,, t.he draw of power from a. shared battery, or broadcasting 
over a particular spccl.rnm baud in n specific geographic area. There are a
set of potential users of these resources, 1 = { 1, ... , n}. A feasible allocation
assigns a subset Xi � X to each i so that the collection of sets X0, X 11 • • •  Xn 
is a partition3 of X. In some cases there is a natural obvious partition, as
for example with rooms in a dormitory, and in other cases there is not, as 
in time on an antenna. Users get utility or profits from each subset which 
we denote Ui(Xi). We will assume throughout that a user's total utility is
Ui(Xi) - Yi where Yi is the money paid to receive the use of Xi. An efficient
feasible allocation a ·-= (X 1, . .. , X 11) is 0110 such that there is no other feasible 
allocation a'= (X�, ... x:J such I.hat L::�1 Ui(XI) > L:��1 Ui(Xi)· Thus, an
efficient allocation solves 
max LUi(Xi) ( 1 )  
.\"1, ... Xn 
n 
subject to uxi�x (2) i=l 
and xinxj = 0 'Vi,j E I. (3) 
If the Ui(·) were knowu. this would he a. complex non-linear computation
which, in principle. could be soh·ecl or apprnxirnatcd. 011c might be tempted
to simply turn it over 1,0 the operations research department. The only diffi­
culties would ho computational complexities. However, in many applications
3LJ{:o xi = x and xi n x j = 0 for all i, j E /. x 0 is the subset of unassigned resources.
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the users want t.o maximize their own interests and not those of the group. 
Therefore, getting accurate information on Ui becomes a problem. Standard
algorithms ask for data on Ui but tho distortions created by incentive com­
patibility constraints may actually lead the algorithms to choose allocations 
with Ei Ui(xi) significantly less than the maximum possible.
· Setting up markets is a.n alternative often mentioned. Here a market 
would be organized for each x E X, with a price p(x) E R, so that i would
pay f'\; p(x )tlx for I.be set X ; . For problems like ours, if a market equilib­
rium exists, the prices would support t.hc solution. That is, for all i and
all XI, Ui(Xi) - fx'? p(x )d:i: 2: Ui(Xf) - fx� p(x )dx where Xf is the optimal
• • 
allocation. 
Unfortunately, there arc many problems for which such a market equi­
librium does not exist. No such function p(x) exists. The classic example
is found in Koopmans a.nd Beckman ( 1957) . Another example is in Banks, 
Ledyard, and Porter ( 1989).  In these cases, one might imagine pricing sub­
sets Xi rather than elenwuts .i: (see, e.g., Papai ( 19�H) ). This can sometimes
create an equilibrium at the cost of creating 21.YI markets, each of which could
be very thin. Not much is knowu about the performance of markets when X 
has a complex, non-convex structure. 
When algorithms and markets will not work very well, some success has 
been realized using a. special type of ascending bid auction. These auc­
tion mechanisms are relatively easy Lo understand and achieve fairly high 
efficiencies. They arc called AUSiv1 (Adaptive User Selection Mechanisms). 
The basic components of AUSivf include: (i) a bid, (Ai, bi), where A s; X 
and b E R, read as i bids bi Lo receive ;ti, and (ii) a provisional allocation,
(X0,X1, . . • •  X11), where Xi is composed of pro\'isiona.lly accepted bids and
Xi = Uk A ik. The 1l..c;;en11ding hid nature of the mechanism comes from the rule
which determines whc1.hcr any new bid is to be included in the provisional al­
location and which bids a.re then to be removed. This revision rule is simple: 
(Ai•,bi•) is accepted if bi•> EikEzbik where z = {jklAiknAi• ::10}. That is
i must agree to pay at least as much as those who will be displaced if i's bid 
is accepted. With this rule, tho sum of the accepted bids EJk bik is always
increasing. The continuous version of AUS.M allows bids to be submitted 
at any time with a rule that specifics when bidding st.ops. This form of the 
process is .. comput.at.iona.lly simple� .hut it. docs.leave open the possibility that
users who only want small subsets ma.y have <lifficult.y displacing users who
have successfull.\· hid for a large subset.. Tl1is problem has been addressed
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by adding a standby queue, described in Banks, Ledyard, and Porter (1989) 
and below in Section 4.2. The queue appears to work reasonably well but
it is possible that another design would be better. That remains an open 
question. 
To summarize, the generic problem facing the mechanism designer for a 
given environment X is to find a process which produces allocations (parti­
tions) with high values of Li Ui(xi)· For our DSN: problem, X is a collection
of heterogeneous items called slots numbered j = 1, ... J which can be occu­
pied by one and only one user. This is a one to many assignment problem. 
The relevant optimization problem for DSN is described in Section 4.3. We
now turn to that specific example of a shared resource problem. 
4 Our Laboratory Environment 
4.1 Supply 
The commodities to be allocated are called slots. Each slot is completely 
specified by a resource and a time. Let S denote the set of slots and Smt€S 
denote the slot on resource m, at time t. There are M resources and T times, 
where m = (1, . .. ,M) and t = (1, . . .  ,T) . The slots can be represented by an M
x T matrix as in Figure 2. Let Pj denote package j, where Pj C S and let
j = 1, . .. , J where J = 2MT - 1 .  Any collection of slots can be considered a
package. In the experimental testbed we developed, M = 2 and T = 1 0  so
that there are 20 slots to be allocated and 220 - 1 possible packages. This is
shown in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2. about here] 
4.2 Demand 
All subjects in the experiments are demanders. There are I demanders,
denoted by i = (1, ... , I), each of whom has a private valuation for each
package. Let ViJ denote demander i's valuation for package j. The valuation
indicates the monetary value demander i will receive if i obtains all of the
slots in the package. ViJ is given in terms of an experimental currency, which 
is called "francs." At the end of each experimental session, subjects are paid 
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an amount of U.S. dollars proportional to the total amount of francs they 
earn by obtaining packages of slots. In this way, valuations are induced, so 
that subjects have a monetary incentive to maximize the total number of 
francs they earn. 4 
In choosing a set of demanders' types, or utility functions, we tried to 
capture the general qualities of the requirements of the DSN users, while 
keeping the types simple and the number of types small. We decided on the 
following four generic types of demand structures. 
1 .  Contiguous: A contiguous demander values packages that are composed 
of slots at adjacent times on the same resource. Often, users of the DSN 
require long periods of continuous coverage during important phases of their 
mission; for example, when mapping a planet or repairing an antenna. In 
the experimenL, contiguous demanders must obtain the same resource for at 
least two times in a row to receive any value. Thus, values for contiguous 
packages are superadditive. 
2. Periodic: A periodic demander values packages that are composed of times
separated by a fixed interval on the same resource. Some users of the DSN 
require contact with their spacecraft at regular time intervals. For example, 
Pioneer 10 must be contacted at least once every 36 hours to readjust its 
communications equipment in order to guarantee future contact. In our ex­
perimental design, periodic demanders need to use slots on the same resource-­
spaced at five time slots apart or otherwise their value is zero. This is an 
example of nonconvexity in the demand structure. 
3. Array: An array demander values packages that are composed of slots
at the same time on multiple resources. Often, it may be desirable to point 
two antennae in the same direction in order to increase the data return rate. 
An example of this occurs during an encounter when all instruments want to 
be sending data using the 70 meter antenna. and the 34 meter antennas at 
the same location simultaneously allow for a higher data transmission rate 
with lower error ( daLa loss) rates. In our design, array demanders require 
two resources at the same time. 
4See Smith (1976) for more on Lhe thc1ory of induced valuation. 
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4. Maintenance: A maintenance demander values as many single slot pack­
ages on resources as he can acquire. This is a representation of the preferences 
of the DSN maintenance staff who are largely indifferent about the time the 
antenna is shut down for maintenance. 
One feature of the information structure in the DSN environment is the 
common knowledge of the times of day at each location which can be of 
use to demanders (all users know when each project is on the same side of 
the earth as a particular antenna complex) .  These times are referred to as 
a spacecraft viewperiod. In the experiments, each demander was assigned 
one of two possible viewperiods, and the number of demanders with each 
viewperiod was known to all subjects. Subjects possessing viewperiods 1 
and 2 had a zero valuation for any slot in times (columns) 1 ,  2 ,  6, or 7 (for
viewperiod 1 )  or in  times 4, 5, 9, and 10 (for viewperiod 2 )  respectively.
In each of our experimental sessions, there were six demanders. Deman­
ders did not know the valuations of any other demanders, but they knew that 
there were a total of three subjects possessing each viewperiod. They also 
knew the set of possible types, but not the exact valuations which demanders 
of the various types would have. Each demander was assigned an identifi­
cation number, one of the four types discussed above and one of the two 
possible viewperiods. The following figure relates the identification numbers, 
the types , and the viewperiods. 
[Figure 3. about here] 
4.3 Schedule 
A schedule is an assignment of slots to demanders. A schedule is feasible if 
i t  satisfies: 
L L Xii� l;'Vm, t (4) ifl jtCmt 
and 
(5) 
where Cmt C J is the set of packages that contain. slot Smt and Xii - 1 if
demander i receives package j and zero otherwise. A slot can be included in 
at most one package that is allocated. Each package can be allocated to at 
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most one demander. Also, a slot cannot be subdivided but must be assigned 
in its entirety. A schedule is efficient if it solves: 
max LL ViiXij 
id jtJ 
(6) 
subject to equations ( t1) and (5 ) .  5 An efficient schedule achieves the high­
est possible total value to demanders of any feasible schedule. Define the 
efficiency of an allocation X 0 as:
(7) 
where E is the efficiency and V is the optimal value. 
4.4 Parameters 
Our experiments were conducted using two sets of parameters (valuations) 
which differed in their level of "contention". The contention level gives us 
an indication as to how much conflict between users is present in the system. 
Our measure of contention (following Olson and Porter ( 1994) ) is: 
w= 
Lj LsEP; Ps 
v 
(8) 
where V is the value of the objective function evaluated at the solution to
the maximization problem and Ps is the dual price of slot s. The levels
of contention are .55 <ind .25 for our high and low contention conditions 
respectively. 
For our parameters, clespit.c t.hc non-convex structure of preferences, the
vector of dual prices p8; s � I, ... , MT, (where MT is the total number of
slots) and the allocation X', where X' solves equation (6) , constitutes a
5This is a form of the problem known in integer programming as the knapsack problem. 
The idea is to choose items to take in a knapsack when one goes on a trip. Each object 
has value, but it also has weight. The problem is to maximize the total value of the
items taken subject to the condition that the total weight is less than or equal to some 
constant. This type of problem is NP-coniplete. The efficient allocation problem is more 
complicated, with one co11strai11t pct· slot a11d a number of packages (objects which could 
be put in the knapsack) that equals 2/\IT - l. 
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competitive equilibrium. \Ve define a competitive equilibrium as a price al­
location pair (x•,p•) = (Xj1, ... , XiJ;pi, .... ,pj.1r) that satisfies the following
two equations: 
p; = O; 'v'sl3 no ·i, j such t.hat s E P1 and Xij = 1 (9) 
and for all i, 3 no X" such .that:
(10) 
The first equation states that if a slot is not included in a package that is 
allocated to some demander, that its price must be zero. Since at price 
zero, the supplier is indifferent to supplying or not supplying the slot, this 
condition insures that there is no positive excess supply of slots. The second 
equation indicates t.hat each player is receiving her optimal allocation given 
the price vector p•. There is no allocation that any demander would prefer
at the price vector p• to x• and thus there is no excess demand at that price
vector. 
It can be verified from inspection of Tables 1-4, which contain the valu­
ations and the dual prices for all packages and slots for both the High and 
Low contention treatments that the dual prices are indeed competitive equi­
librium prices for the parameters used i11 t.hc experiment.
!Table 1. about hereJ
[Table 2 .  about here] 
!Table 3. about hereJ
[Table it. about hereJ
5 Allocation (Scheduling) Mechanisms 
In this section we describe the general foC\tures of.the three mechanisms whose 
performance we test in the environments of Section 3. The first mechanism 
we test is designed to capture some of the basic features of the current process 
1 1  
used by JPL in the allocation of the DSN. It combines a committee process, 
a decision support algorithm, and a bureaucratic appeals process (see Figure
1 ) .  While we would not expect this mechanism to perform very well, we 
evaluate it t,o provide a benchmark against, which to judge the performance of 
other mechanisms. In particular, since the research task was to find a better 
way to allocate shared resources like the DSN, we need to demonstrate that 
the new mechanisms proposed are indeed potentially better than the existing 
one. 
We test two alternatives to the current process. First, we auction off 
the various slots using AUSM which was originally designed for a different 
allocation problem by Banks, Ledyard, and Porter (1989). It is an ascending
bid auction which allows bids for packages of slots as well as for individual 
slots. It also has a feature called a standby queue which is designed to 
help bidders overcome the "threshold" problem common to these types of 
combinatoric problems. This mechanism is described in more detail below. 
Although the A USf\·1 with queue generally achieves high efficiencies, it
also generally extracts significant surplus from the bidders. So what users 
have been getting inefficiently, but for free, may now be allocated efficiently 
but at a real monetary cost to them. The net benefit to the users, which 
we call users' surplus, can actually decline significantly when moving from a 
committee process to an auction even though efficiency improves. Proposing 
such a mechanism for the DSN problem is politically untenable. No mech­
anism w�ich leaves current, users significantly worse off will be adopted in
an environment which values the users' opinions. 6 To see whether we can 
overcome this political constraint we test a third mechanism which we call 
AUSM with tokens. We use the same mechanism as above but we give all 
users an allocation of tokens with which to bid. 7 Our conjecture was that 
while this mechanism might not achieve the same levels of efficiency that an 
auction with real monetary transfers would, it would still leave users bet­
ter off because it would allow and provide incentives for users to identify. 
tradeoffs but would not, require them to pay additional funds. 
6For more on rncichanism desig11 in which political constraints are important, see Led­
yard (1993). 
7This approach has sometime� hcen used in practice with some success (measured 
by users' satisfaction surveys). · Examples· include scheduling "business school interviews, 
managing computer allocations, etc. 
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5.1 Negotiation (Committee Process) 
In this section we represent the process currently used in the allocation8 of 
DSN slots. We keep that representation in a form that can be implemented 
experimentally so that data on performance in a controlled setting can be 
acquired. The experiment is computerized, with each subject seated at his 
own terminal. The procedure occurs in three phases: 
Phase 1: The Request Phase (See Appendix A for a numerical exam­
ple. ) Demanders submit requests for packages of slots of the form (n , T, Q, 
R) , where:
• n E {l, 2, . . .  , 20} is the number of slots requested,
• T E {contiguous, periodic, array, maintenance} is the type of request,
• Q E { 1, 2} is the quality of resource where a is an antenna (resource)
of quality l and b is an antenna of quality 2, and
•R E {O. 1 . . . . , 9} equals the range of t,he slots requested (the range equals
the number of the rightmost column ( time) in the request minus the number 
of the leftmost column in the request) . 
There is a cost to each request C(n ,T,Q,R) which i s  decreasin g  i n  the 
range specified (flexibility) and increasing in resource quality and the num­
ber of slots requested. The function is: 
C(n,T,Q,R ) = (3 - Q) (15 - R)n francs
where francs are the experimental currency. Although there are no direct 
costs assessed in the current procedure at DSN, there are important oppor­
tunity costs since large and inflexible requests lead to likelihood of conflict 
with additional committee time required and potential for appeals to upper 
management.  The function C is intended to capture these costs.
Using the requests , a two-stage algorithm creates a schedule. The algo­
rithm we used is the actual algorithm (RALPH) used by JPL. All requests 
are included in the schedule. The algorithm minimizes the "average" level of 
contention for the resources and maximizes the "average" level of resource 
utilization. In the first stage it assigns fractions of each request made to every 
possible combination of slots which would satisfy the request. In the second 
stage the requests are consolidated sq �\�. t.o spre.a.d out the excess demand
8For a dctail<Jd d�cription of Ltw process 11s<Jd at JPL see Olson and Porter (1991}. 
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for slots as evenly as possible across slots. In other words, in two stages, it 
finds a solution to the following: 
( 1 1 )  
There are typically multiple solutions to equation ( 1 1 ) .  The algorithm selects 
the schedule based on the order in which the scheduler inputs the requests 
from a mission event priority guideline provided by management. Note that 
multiple demanders may be assigned to the same slot. Conflicts from the 
multiple assignments of a slot are then negotiated in a user committee. 
Phase 2: The Negotiation Phase Once the algorithm has operated,
there follows a negotiation phase. Herc demanders may freely communicate 
and agree to drop or swit.ch slots which they have been allocated. Although 
there is no direct restriction on the number of switches, all negotiations have 
to be completed in a predetermined time interval, which is known to all sub­
jects. A demander's action in the negotiation phase may be either of the
following: 
1. A demander may agree to unilaterally give up her assignment to a
slot. This may occur in the context of a binding agreement with other
subjects who also agree to give up their assignments.
2. A demander may give his currently assigned slot to another demander.
This could also form a pa.rt of a larger agreement with any number of
other subjects.
In our experiment, the experimenter manually alters the schedules for all 
subjects from his computer terminal to reflect the agreements concluded in 
the negotiation phase. 
Phase 3: The Appeals Phase When agreement cannot be reached on
the allocation of the schedule even after negotiation, the contending users 
can appeal.to higher,levels of management. ·  In· the experiment, any conflicts
which are still unresolved after the negotiation phase are settled through an 
appeals process which reduces the number of demanders in any slot to one. 
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We sidestep the issue of the preferences of the higher level of management by 
conducting the appeals process anonymously on the computer and treating 
all of the subjects equally during the process. To capture the idea that larger 
requests are more difficult to appeal, we require that a separate appeal be 
made for each slot. In all of our experiments the appeals process treats the 
appeals of all contending users equally, although this may not be the case at 
JPL or other organizations. During the appeals phase, subjects are required 
to specify for every slot, to which they and at least one other demander are 
assigned, whether they wish to be involved in the appeal process. There 
is a per slot cost to demanders who appeal, which was equal to 100 francs 
in the experiment, again to represent the opportunity costs involved. Each 
demander appealing for a slot has an equal probability of receiving the slot 
in the final allocation. No demander may make an appeal for a slot which is 
not assigned to him after Phase 2.  
At the end of Phase 3 an allocation is determined and subjects receive 
profits. Demanders' requests and appeals are unobservable to other subjects. 
Communication between subjects is permitted only in the negotiation phase. 
5.2 Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (Auction) 
The adaptive user selection mechanism (AUSM), is a computerized ascending 
price auction in which demanders enter bids for packages of slots. All slots 
and all packages are auctioned continuously and simultaneously. (Also see­
Section 3 . )  A demander can enter an integer bid for any package. Let bi; > 0
denote a bid by demander i for package j. The process can be most easily 
understood using the concept of a standing bid. Let S; be the standing
bid for package j. At any time the collection of packages for which there 
is a standing bid will constitute a feasible allocation. A new bid, b�3, can
become a standing bid if it is greater than the sum of all standing bids for all 
packages which contain slots which intersect with package j. In other words 
b�i is accepted and becomes a new standing bid s; when:
(12) 
The previous standing bids Sk, where k is as defined in equation {12), are
then displaced and are no longer considered standing bids. An important 
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feature of this process is t.ha.t the sum of all standing bids can only increase 
when a new bid is accepted. 9 When the auction closes, the demander in 
possession of the current standing bid for package j receives that package. 
The auction was closed manually by the experimenter at random within 
a time interval known to subjects, although the exact time of closing was 
not known to them in advance. The auction was open for 6-8 minutes in the
early periods of each experiment and 4-6 minutes in the late periods. The
random ending was designed to prevent a sudden surge of bidding activity at 
the end of the market period which would occur if the exact time of closing 
were known to bidders. 10 Also, if at any time,no new bid was received for a 
20 second time interval, the market was closed by the experimenter. 
This mechanism as it stands has an undesirable feature that may lead 
to inefficient outcomes, because larger users can prevent smaller but higher­
valued users from winning. Suppose, for example, that demander 1 has a 
valuation of 3000 francs for a package consisting of items la, 2a, and 3a, 
demander 2 has a valuation of 2000 francs for item la, and demander 3 has a 
valuation of 2000 for a package consisting of items 2a and 3a. In the highest­
valued allocation, demander 2 receives item la and demander 3 receive 2a
and 3a. However, if demander 1 hids 2001 francs for the package of la, 2a, 
and 3a, then neither demander 2 nor demander 3 can unilaterally displace 
l's standing bid without bidding more than his individual value. Thus, the 
mechanism produces an inefficient outcomes. 
To overcome this threshold coordination problem, a feature called Standby 
Queue for Unifying Individual Demanders (SQUID) was added to the Adap­
tive User Selection Mechanism.11 This queue allows individual demanders 
to jointly submit bids in order to displace standing bids for large packages. 
A public bulletin board is provided for bidders where they can place a bid
that they would be willing to have win but which is not sufficiently large 
to become a standing bid by itself. In the above example, a bid to pay 
9It is, of course, possible for the standing bids of any particular package to fluctuate 
over time. 
10The experimenter drew closing times before the periods started using a random num­
ber generator. This allowed the experimenter to be sure that he was unaffected by the 
market activity during the period when deciding when to close the market. 
11The idea is to provide a forum for communication sj,nce experifl)ental evidence suggests 
that the best way to overcome the threshold problem is to allow subjects to communicate. 
See Ledyard {199'1) for a survey of some of these experiments. 
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1300 for slot 1 a by demander 2 would be such a bid. Once placed on the 
standby queue, that bid can be used by others in concert with their own bid 
to displace a large bid such as the bid of 2001 for the package of slots la, 
2a and 3a by demander 1. In the example, once demander 2 has placed a 
bid in the queue, demander .3 can then choose to combine a bid of his own
with demander 2's offer on the standby queue. He might then bid 702 francs 
for slots 2a and 3a in combination with 2's offer of 1300 for la. Since they 
jointly have a sufficiently high bid t.o displace demander 1 's bid they can do 
so. Demander 3 can unilaterally execute the joint bid and 2's component is 
binding on 2 once it is executed. Prior to execution, bids can be withdrawn 
from the standby queue. Any number of bids could be combined to form one 
joint bid, with the limitation that each bidder could have at most two bids 
on the standby queue at any time. Bids cannot be withdrawn when they are 
a standing bid. 
5.3 AUSM with Tokens 
The AUSM mechanism wit.h the standby queue was also implemented as a 
mechanism where bids were made, not in terms of an experimental currency 
convertible to U.S. dollars, but rather using tokens which had no value to 
demanders ·and which served only as a medium of exchange. Each demander 
received a budget of tokens at the beginning of each period with which to 
bid. Any tokens remaining at the end of the period had no value to the 
demander and were forfeited before the start of the next period. 
Since the initial distribution of tokens is an important aspect in the design 
of any bidding mechanism which uses tokens, we included two subconditions 
in the research design, which differed only in the amount of tokens with which 
subjects were endowed at the beginning of each period. In the Equal Endow­
ment condition, each subject received an equal endowment of tokens each 
period. In the Competitive Endowment condition, the endowment of tokens 
available to each subject was proportional to the minimum number of francs 
required by each subject to achieve the competitive equilibrium allocation.12
In each of the four experimental sessions of AUSM/tokens, each endowment 
was used for at least three market periods. Subjects were always informed 
if the endowmenlis were going to.change int.he next· period; Subjects knew 
12If the minimum wa.s less thall :, francs. the endowment given was raised to 5 francs.
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their own endowment but not the endowment of other demanders. Subjects 
also knew that there were only two possible initial distributions. The initial 
allocations of tokens to subjects are given in Table 5 .  
[Table 5 about here] 
Although some of the demanders in the Competitive Endowment con­
dition (demander 5 in low· contention and demander 6 in high contention) 
received endowments much lower than other demanders, they were never­
theless usually able to purchase units, since there existed packages for which 
only they had a positive valuation. 
5.4 Sequential Random Efficiency 
One metric by which to evaluate the performance of a mechanism in a partic­
ular environment is to compare the efficiency achieved to that generated by 
a naive computer algorithm. This protects against claims of superior perfor­
mance by a mechanism when it is really only an "easy" environment which 
allows high efficiencies. The algorithm we have chosen is a generalization of 
the sequential dictator algorithm analyzed in Olson and Porter (1994) .  The 
algorithm consists of the following steps. 
1 .  Pick a user. Each user is picked with equal probability. 
2 .  Allocate to that user his most valuable package which is feasible. A pack­
age is feasible if no subset of it has been allocated to any other demander. 
3. Go to 1 .  if there exist slots which have not been allocated.
4. Compute Li Li ViiX ii for that allocation,  divide by V, multiply by 100.
The algorithm was run 10000 times for each set of parameters. The re­
sults of the first 2500 runs are depicted in Figures 4 and 5 .  The algorithm 
generates an average efficiency of 89. 79 and 82.61 for the low and high con­
tention conditions respectively, with standard deviations of 9.02 and 8. 76. 
The algorithm results·in -the-optimal allocation 28�94 and 2.25 percent of the 
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time in the low and high contention conditions, rcspectively. 13 
[Figure 4. about hereJ
[Figure 5. about hcreJ 
6 Results 
All of the 12 experiments were conducted in April 1 993 at the Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics and Political Science at the California Institute of 
Technology. Each experiment consisted of between 8 and 12  market periods.
All subjects were undergraduates or pre-freshmen at the Institute. In the fol­
lowing table, we display some design information concerning the experiments: 
[Table 6. about here]
In the rows corresponding to AUSM/tokens in  the column labelled Num. 
Periods, the two numbers in parcnt.heses represent the nu.mber of periods 
in the session where the Equal and the Competitive endowment conditions 
respectively were in effect. The instructions used in the experiments can be 
found in Appendix B. 
6.1 The Data 
Our analysis of the effects on allocative efficiency and the cost to users of 
varying the level of contention and of replication of the market conditions 
is based on the estimation of regression equations. The following equations 
were estimated using the data from the committee and the AUSM/money
processes: 
i = 1, 2 (13) 
y1 =efficiency (as defined in equation 11) and v2=cost to users. Users' surplus
can then be computed as Yi - Y2· The cost to users is the percentage of V 
13The algorithm generates, ori average, higher efficiencies under low contention for our 
parameters, although, in general, higher contention does not always imply lower average 
efficiency. 
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paid out by subjects during the market period. In the committee process it is 
equal to the request costs plus the appeals costs. For the AUSM/money the 
cost to users is equal to the amount of cash paid out by subjects to obtain 
their allocation. There are no costs to subjects in the AUSM/tokens. 
The variable period is equal to the number of market periods that have 
elapsed in the experimental session including the current period.  It can be 
interpreted as a variable which isolates the effect of the learning or experience 
of subjects on the value of the dependent variable. The dummy variable hicon 
takes on a value of 1 in the high contention treatments and a value of 0 in 
the low contention treatments and therefore identifies the effect of variations 
in the contention level. 
The following equation was estimated for the AUSM/tokens data: 
e = f3o + {31period + f32hicon + {33compendow (14) 
where e=efficiency and compendow=l if the Competitive Endowment con­
dition is in effect and equals 0 otherwise. For the AUSM/tokens data, since 
all rents go to the demanders, market efficiency is exactly equal to users' 
surplus. The variable compendow identifies the effect on efficiency of varying 
the initial endowment of tokens. The results of the estimations of the five 
equations are given in the following table. The standard errors of the esti­
mates are given in parentheses. 
[Table 7. about here . ]  
Tables 8-10 contain the estimated efficiency and the estimated cost to 
users of each of the three allocation mechanisms in periods 1 and 10, as well 
as under the two contention levels. The numbers in tables 8-10 are taken 
from the estimated coefficients in Table 7. L and H represent the Low and 
High contention treatments respectively. Ll and LIO denote the estimated
value of the relevant variable in periods 1 and 10 respectively in the low 
contention condition. The estimates in tables 8-10 .are the values of the re­
gression in the relevant period and treatment, and not the actual observed 
values of the variables. Thus, it is possible, as in the low contention period 
10 estimate of the cost in the committee process, that the estimated value 
could be negative although the actual. costs must always :be greater than or 
equal to zero. The figures in parentheses give the probability that the ef­
ficiency or the users' surplus from the sequential dictator algorithm is less 
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than or equal to the estimated surplus from the mechanism. So low numbers 
in parentheses indicate poor performance by the mechanism relative to the 
sequential dictator (random) algorithm. 
[Table 8. about hereJ
The efficiency gcnernted by the committee process at the beginning of the 
experimental sessions is less than that generated by the random algorithm 
in both the high and the low contention environments. In the low contention 
condition, however, the efficiency of the committee process improves over 
time so that, on average, it ·is better than the random algorithm by period
10. However, in the high contention environment, the committee performs
very poorly and, even by period 10, does not achieve efficiencies as high as
the random algorithm. 
The costs to users in the committee process decline with time as users ap­
parently learn to avoid these bureaucratic frictions. Higher contention makes 
such avoidance more difficult. The most remarkable finding is that only in a 
low contention environment; and only after a number of replications does the 
current committee process, with a decision support algorithm, outperform 
the simple sequential dictator algorithm. 
[Table 9. about hereJ
From an efficiency point of view, A USM/money performs better than the 
committee in both the high and the low contention conditions. The efficiency 
is also increasing over time. By the tenth period, A USM significantly out­
performs both t.hc committee process and the sequential dictator algorithm.
However, increases in efficiency are associated with increasing costs to the 
users so that user surplus remains unchanged. In fact, users' surplus is sub­
stantially less under AUSM than under the committee process or under the 
random algorithm described in section 5.4. 
[Table 10. about hereJ
Under the AUSM/tokens, efficiency and, thus, users' surplus increases 
over time. The efficiency is higher under high than under low contention. Un­
der high contention, the users' surplus was largest under the AUSM/tokens 
mechanism than any. of the three others. · Furthermore,. as can be seen in
Table 7, changing the t.oken endowment had no effect on the efficiency levels 
recorded. T his is somewhat unexpected so it is reasonable to consider fur-
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ther the distributional effects of the different token endowments. A natural 
measure of this effect is the sample variance of payoffs among the users which 
can be defined as: 
5'2 = t (ni - 7f)2 
i= l I - 1 
(15) 
where, S2 is the sample variance, n i is the profit of demander i, which equals 
the sum of his valuations ( in terms of francs) for the packages he receives and 
7f is the average profit of demanders. The variance is analysed by estimating
the equation below. The estimates are reported in Table 11: 
S2 = f3o + /31period + f32hicon + f33compendow (16) 
[Table 11. about here]
One can sec i 11 Ta.hie 1 1  I.hat. t.hc change in endowment also has no sig­
nificant effect on the variance of the payoffs. The fact that the variances
are not different, however, does not suggest that there were no distributional 
differences under the two endowments. For example, under low contention, 
demanders 3 and 4 were substantially worse off (payoffs were 15 and 19 per­
cent lower respectively) ,  while demander 6 was better off (by 19  percent) in
the Equal Endowment condition than than in  the Competitive Endowment 
condition. Under high contention, demander 4 received considerably higher
payoffs (by 30 percent) in the Competi tive Endowment condition while de­
mander 6 received considerably lower payoffs (by 37 percent) .  The two fol­
lowing tables show the percentage of market periods in  both subconditions 
in which each demander received each of the packages which had value to 
him. The columns labelled EE and CE indicate the percentage of the time
that package Pj was allocated to demander i under the Equal Endowment
and Competitive Endowment treatments respectively. 
[Table 12. about here] 
[Table 1 3 .  about here!
Under hot.h endowrncm t.s and ho t.Ii  levels of contention, each package ex­
cept for packa-ge (l h; 6b) under low· contention '" in the Equal Endowment 
condition, was allocated efficiently (that is to the correct demander) at least 
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50 percent of the time. This suggests that efficiencies under both endow­
ments are high and not much different from each other. Under both sets 
of endowments of tokens, the demanders with the highest valuations were 
generally able to bid high enough to price out competing demanders. Even 
the very small endowments of demander 5 under low contention and deman­
der 6 under high contention were enough to allow the user to purchase the 
packages which they would receive in the competitive equilibrium, because 
there were no competing demanders for these packages. 
Under high contention, demanders 1 ,  2 and 5, who were in  the same view­
period, usually received the same allocations across the two endowments. 
Demanders 3 and '1 ,  who were in the same viewperiod a.s demander 6, some­
times purchased packages meant for ea.ch other. Demander 4 had a much
larger endowment of tokens in the Competitive Endowment condition than 
demander 3 who in turn had a much larger endowment than demander 6. Not 
surprisingly, 4 received packages (lb, 6b) , (2a, 7a) and (2b, 7b) more often
in the Competitive Endowment condition when he had a larger endowment. 
The maintanance demander 6, received the same packages less often when 
she had the smaller endowment. 3 was able to purchase ( lb,6b) more often in 
the Competitive Endowment condit,ion , easily outbidding demander 6, who 
was never able to purchase ( l b, 6b) in the Competitive Endowment condition
but was able to purchase it 36 percent of the time in the Equal Endowment 
condition. The average allocative efficiency under the two endowments was 
93 . 7 and 95 .3 for the Equal and Competitive endowments respectively. 
A similar pattern occured under low contention. The contiguous deman­
ders 1 and 2 usually divided packages (9a, 1 0a) and (9b, lOb) between them. 
Demanders 3 and 4 often received packages intended for the other, with 4
receiving more packages under the Competitive Endowment condition, when 
his token endowment was greater, usually at the expense of demander 6. 
Demander 5, with his very low endowment in the Competitive treatment, 
was able to obtain his  most. preferred package , but his budget was too low
to obtain the other package. Demander 6 was substantially worse off in  
the Competitive Endowment condition since she was less able to compete 
in the bidding with demanders 3 and 4. 3 was sometimes able to get the 
package consisting of { l a, 6a) and 4 received (3a, Sa) and ( lb,  6b) more of­
ten. Efficiency was on average 87.0 and . 90.2 .in the Equal and Competitive 
Endowment treatments respectively. 
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6.2 Discussion 
Under low contention, the Committee process provides more surplus to users 
as a whole than the A USM/tokens which in turn provides more users ' surplus 
than AUSM/moncy. Th is is consist.ent with the field observation that there 
is often little effort to replace committees with market-type systems of allo­
cation when conflict between users is not too severe even though efficiency 
may be low. The committee process gives users more surplus than the two 
other mechanisms even though it does no better than the sequential dictator 
algorithm. Under high contention, however, AUSM/tokens yields the highest 
surplus to the users, followed in order by the sequential dictator algorithm, 
the committee and AUSM/money. The committee clearly fails when the level 
of contention increases since the cost of negotiation and conflict resolution 
increases and the ability of the mechanism to allocate the schedule efficiently 
diminishes. AUSM /tokens behaves in the opposite way. The user surplus is 
higher when contention is high, since the efficiency is higher and user costs 
are zero. Under hoth high and low contention, the AUSM/money, with its 
extraction of rents from the users , generates lower users' surplus than the 
other mechanisms. When highly efficient auctions such as AUSM are pro­
posed by economists to solve allocation problems, we should expect such 
recommendations to encounter resistance from thoughtful future bidders in 
the auction. 
The relatively strong performance of the sequential dictator algorithm is 
not surprising. The sequential dict.ntor algorithm has aspects which give it 
a good chance to enhance efficiency. One is  the fact that it sidesteps the 
information revelation problem, by choosing for each subject his most pre­
ferred package. 1 4 Our implementation thus assumed perfect information but 
the resulting allocations were compared against those generated by the in­
teraction of strategic agents in an incomplete information environment. The 
efficiency of the sequential dictator as we have measured it should therefore 
only be treated as a benchmark and this paper should not be considered a 
test of its performance as a mechanism. 
From the standpoint of system efficiency, some of the mechanisms are 
superior to others. Under low conLenLion, AUSM/money, the committee and 
14 In the one- to-one assign ment prohlcm. such honest revelation is a dominant strat­
egy. (Sec Olson ( 1 99:1) anrl Olson anrl Port.c•r ( 1 99'1)). This is no longer true in this
fundamentally morn complex 111a11y to 0110 env ironment. 
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the sequential dictator algorithm perform better than AUSM/tokens. Under 
high contention AUSM/money and AUSM/tokens generate more efficient 
allocations than the random algorithm, which in turn had more efficient 
outcomes than the committee. This reinforces the findings of Banks et al. 
( 1989) that the AUS:M is capable of generating very high allocative efficiencies 
in complex non-convex environments. 
There is evidence of improvement over time in the level of efficiency in all 
three of the mechanisms. The estimated efficiency level is higher in period 
ten than in period one in all six conditions. Cost declined in the committee 
as users seemed to learn to avoid conflicts over time. In AUSM/money, the 
revenue extracted from the users increased with replication of the auction, 
and rising revenue seemed to be related to increasing efficiency. 
Although varying the distribution of tokens in A USM/tokens had no effect 
on total payoffs or on the variance of payoffs for the particular parameters of 
our experiment, the distributions of payoffs across subjects was different, as 
demanders with lower endowments received lower payoffs. The robustness of 
this market efficiency finding should be interpreted with caution and does not 
suggest that the initial distribution of tokens can be ignored by planners in 
field applications. The result does suggest, however, that there is some ro'om 
for flexibility in varying the initial distribution of tokens, without causing 
large fluctuations in allocative efficiency. 
7 What Have We Learned ? 
At the beginning of this paper we presented a stylized story to i llustrate why 
user committees might be able to survive as organizational devices to manage 
shared facilities even though it is widely recognized by both the users and the 
organization that significant value is being foregone. Our study provides new 
evidence supporting the foundations of this pessimistic view. However, our 
study, using the methodology of applied mechanism design, also establishes 
that there are viable alternatives to user committees that do not involve 
large losses in value to the users. This provides some evidence that signif­
icant increases in value, for both users and the organization ,  can be found 
and captured by using designed mechanisms to improve the management of 
shared facilities. 
The basis for these somewhat sweeping statements can be found in three 
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key findings of our study. We split the first finding focusing on the perfor­
mance of user committees into two parts. ( la) Experienced user committees 
using decision support algorithms produce reasonably efficient allocations 
in lower conflict situations. The key facts supporting this observation are 
found in Table 8. By period 10 in  the low contention environment, the user 
committees are achieving , on average, 963 of the maximum value with vir­
tually no cost to the users. ·  The probability that the user committee yields 
a higher value than the random algorithm is, however, only 713, which may 
not be good but good enough to support the continued use of the commit­
tee. ( lb) Experienced !!§g[ committees using decision support algorithms
produce reasonably bad allocations in high conflict situations. The key facts 
supporting this observation are also found in Table 8. By period 10 in the 
high contention environment the user committees are achieving on average, 
773 of the maximum value with a cost to users of 53 of the maximum value. 
The basis for describing this performance as bad is that the probability that 
the user committee yields a higher value than the random algorithm is only 
10% in the high contention environment. There is obviously significant value 
being foregone. 
The second key finding concerns the viability of an "economic" solution 
for the recovery of the value foregone. We also split this into two parts. (2a) 
There is an economic process, called the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism 
(AUSM) ,  in which .!!§fil.§. bid and pay dollars for time, which yields high 
efficiencies in high-conflict situations. The key facts supporting this observa-� 
tion are found in Table 9. In the very first period and in the high contention 
environment, AUSM/Money is achieving 863 of the maximum possible value. 
By period 10 in the high contention environment it is achieving, on aver­
age, 963 of the maximum possible value. The basis for calling this high is 
that the probability that the random algorithm would do better is only 53. 
There is obviously significant value being created by this economic solution 
- about a 253 increase in value over the user committee and,  using a better 
measure of improvement, a 3653 increase in the probability of beating the 
random algorithm. (2b) Because of the prices paid, the economic solution of
A USM/Money leaves users significantly � .Qff .th.a.n. ll§fil: committees .dQ. 
The key facts supporting this observation are found in Tables 8 and 9. Look­
ing at period 10 in .the high .. contention environment, we see that the user 
committee leaves a users' surplus of 723 whereas, because of the payment
of fees, AUSrd leaves the users a surplus of only 433. Neither is particu-
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larly desirable, since it is essentially a sure thing (almost a 1003 probability) 
that the random algorithm would yield a higher surplus than AUSM.  There 
should remain little mystery as to why user committees don 't like market 
solutions especially in those high contention situations where they are most 
often espoused. 
The third key finding concerns the existence of better mechanisms for 
both the users and the organization. (3) There is � modification Qf AUSM 
in which tokens, QI internal money, replace rfil!l money and which results 
in highly efficient allocations without extracting any of the users' surplus. 
The key facts supporting this observation are found in Table 10. By pe­
riod 10 in the high contention condition, with an equal allocation of tokens 
A.USM/Tokens is producing on average efficiency and users' surplus equal to 
973 of the maximum possible. This is very high in the sense that there is 
only a 53 chance that the random allocation would produce a higher value. 
(A surprising and unexplained fact is that this is as high a gross value on 
average as AUSM/Money achieves. )  
We conclude with several policy thoughts. From the point of view of a 
planner interested in achieving a high allocative efficiency, AUSM is clearly 
the best of the mechanisms considered here. The efficiencies generated by 
A USM are, in our view, very high considering the complex combinatorics re­
quired by the non-convexities in the preference structure of the environment. 
We are doubtful that other mechanisms could do better although it surely 
remains an open research challenge to find a better one. 
From the point of view overall users' surplus, mechanisms can be found 
which surpass A USM/money. When contention is low, it seems to be difficult 
to improve upon the current committee process. None of our alternative 
mechanisms were able to . This may be why extensive conflict is necessary 
before users are willing to discard committee systems. When contention is 
high we find that A.USM/Tokens generates very high surpluses for the users. 
The tokens seem to provide enough information to coordinate the allocation 
of slots efficiently, yet the buyers do not have to give up any surplus. This 
effect was surprisingly robust to changes in the initial endowment of tokens. 
When conflict is high , it will be revealed in complaints about the current 
committee/negotiation process. Under these circumstances, using a carefully 
designed ·auction with tokens ·may appeal to the users in a way that an auc­
tion using real money would not. The remaining hinderance to the adoption 
of AUSM/tokens is the fact that the initial endowment of tokens must be 
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determined. In the experiments reported in this paper, some demanders were 
considerably better off under one or the other allocations of token endow­
ments. Since this is likely to be the case anywhere in the field, and since users 
are likely to know this. it can impede a transition from committees to bet­
ter designed mechanisms unless one can find an appropriate grandfathering 
procedure. This is the subject of future economic design research. 
28 
A An Example of Phase 1 of the Committee 
Process 
Suppose that there is one resource (M= l ) ,  and there are three times (T=3) ,  
so that there are a total o f  three slots. For this example denote the three slots 
as slots 1 ,2  and 3 ,  according to time. The resource is of quality 1 ,  and there 
are two users, each of whom makes one request. User l 's request is (2 ,C, 1 , 1-
3) , that is (2 slots, at adjacent times, on a quality 1 resource, anywhere
between columns 1 and 3 ) ,  and user 2 's request is ( 1 ,M, 1 , 1-3) .  The request 
costs are therefore (3 - 1 ) ( 1 5 - 2)2  = 338 and (3 - 1 ) (15 - 2) = 26 respectively. 
There are two possible packages which satisfy request 1 and three which 
satisfy request 2. The first stage of phase 1 results in the following provi­
sional allocation: 
For user l 's request: . 5  weight on the package consisting of slots 1 and 2 and 
. 5 weight on the package consisting of slots 2 and 3. 
For user 2 's  request, 1 /3 weight on each of the three possible single slot pack­
ages, consisting of one of al ,  a2 and a3 respectively. 
In the second stage of phase 1 .  the stage 1 allocations are consolidated to
one of two possible assignments . which are: 
1 )  lJ ser 1 is assigned slots 1 and 2, user 2 is assigned slot 3 .
2) User 2 is  assigned slots 2 and 3 ,  user 2 is  assigned slot 1 .
B Instructions Read to Subjects 
The following pages contain the instructions which were read aloud to sub­
jects at the beginning of each experimental session. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
I. GENERAL 
You are about to participate in an experiment in which you will make decisions 
m a market. If you follow the instructions carefully, you might earn a considerable 
amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. For this experiment all 
transactions will be in terms of francs. You can convert your franc earnings into U.S. 
dollars at a rate of ----- francs to 1 U.S. dollar. You will be paid at the end of the 
experiment. 
The experiment will be broken-up into a series of periods in which you will make 
decisions. Each period you will be given a Redemption Value Sheet which describe the 
val.ue to you of decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to 
anyone. A Redemption Value Sheet lists packages of items and the value in francs to 
you of that package of items. Below you will find an example Redemption Value Sheet 
with three packages. 
REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET 
Package Value 
Item Item Item Item Item 
7a Sb 9b 2000 
7a Sb soo 
5b 500 
A package is defined as a set of up to 4 items. An item, which will be described 
in more detail later, is simply a unique number and letter identification. Associated 
with each package is the value to you in francs, of obtaining the items in the package. 
For example, in the sheet above the package consisting of items 7a, Sb and 9b has a
value of 2000 francs. However, if you were to only obtain items 7a and Sb you would
only receive SOO francs. You can obtain items to make packages through a process we
will describe later. Your earnings for a period are the sum of the values of the packages 
you have at the end of the period minus � cost in obtaining the packages.
Some clarifications: 
• Only packages you have in your possession at the end Qf � period count
toward your earnings . Costs are given as the sum of the costs you have incurred over 
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the period. 
• An item can be used in one and only one package at the end of a period.
Il. ITEMS TO BE ALLOCATED 
You are one of _ _ _  participants in our experiment. Information concerning the 
allocation of items and your specific allocation of items will be displayed to you through 
your computer terminal. For the experiment you be given an ID number which is 
displayed in the upper left-hand corner of your screen. 
You can find a display of all of the items to be allocated by pressing D. An item 
is determined by a row and a column. There are a total of 60 items arranged in four 
resource rows (a, b, c and d) of fifteen column positions each. In the figure below titled
Subject Detail Screen the items are displayed (you will only be able to see five positions 
at a time on your computer screen. You can use your arrow keys to move around and 
see the rest of the display). An X in a resource position means the item will never be 
part of a package which has value to you and therefore it is not usable to you. There 
are two possible con.figuration of usable items to participants (Con.figuration A and B). 
There are four participants possessing each con.figuration. If you currently have an item 
your ID number will be placed in the upper portion of a highlighted resource position 
box. For example, in the figure below participant 2 currently has items a2 and b4. 
SUBJECT DETAIL SCREEN 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
2 
a 
2 
b 
c 
d 
In summary, the items available for allocation are specified by: 
• A resource (a, b, c or d) and a position (1-15). Thus item a7 is defined as resource a
in position 7. 
• The set of usable items to a participant is given by an items Con.figuration of A or
B. 
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• The current allocation is given in the subject detail screen listing participant IDs in
resource position boxes. 
ill. PARTICIPANT TYPES 
In each market period, participants will be assigned to one of four different types. 
Your type for a period, which can be found in the upper right hand corner of your 
period Redemption Value Sheet, can be either: 
• Contiguous types which value packages that are adjacent to one another 
on the same resource. For example, in the figure below, participant 1 has a potential 
contiguous package composed of 3a, 4a and 5a. 
• Peri.odic types only value packages that contain items that are spaced 
five positions apart on the same resource. An example of this type of package is given 
in the figure by participant 3's potential package of la and 6a. 
• Array types value packages that use resources · a  and b in the same 
positions. An example of this is participant 4's potential package of 7a and 7b. 
• Maintenance types value any single position resource that is usable. Two 
examples are participant 6's potential packages of 2b or lOb. 
SUMMARY: 
1 
3 
a 
b 
2 
Start terns 
6 
Period onfig. 
A ,B) 
SUBJECT DETAIL SCREEN 
3 4 5 6 7 
1 1 1 3 � 
4 
emand ackage ocation 
alues 
C,P,A,M Redemp. 
Value 
Sheet) 
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Packages 
Period 
End 
Costs 
Earnings 
IV. THE ALLOCATION PROCESS
At the beginning of each period, you will be able to submit a request for 
packages to be scheduled in the sixty possible resource position boxes. To submit a 
request for packages just prP.ss R to get your request form. A screen resembling th� one 
below should appear. 
Request Screen 
Ant Unit Type Begin End Period 
A single request for a package consists of a filled out row in the request form. 
The request is composed of: 
(i) A nt defines the resource row you would like, the possibilites are: 
a or b 
(ii) Unit describes the number of columns of the resource you want. 
(iii) Type describes how you want your package designed, the possibilities are: 
C for contiguous, A for array, P for periodic, and M for maintenance
(iv) Begin corresponds to the minimum column number to start the package at. 
( v) End corresponds to the maximum column number to end the package on. 
(vi) Period describes the number of columns to separate the units by. It is only 
used with requests of type P. 
EXAMPLE: 
Suppose you want to request the following three packages: 
( 1 )  a6. 
(2) Three contiguous columns on a. 
(3) Any 2 columns on resource b anywhere from column 4 to column 10.  
These three requests are filled-in the the form below: 
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Request Screen 
Ant Unit Type Begin End Period 
a. 1 M 6 6 
a. 3 c 1 10 
b 2 M 4 10 
Once you have typed in all the of requests you would like have scheduled for the 
period press <Esc> and then Y to confirm your requests. You can send in only one 
request form per period. Each request in the request form that you send to the 
scheduler has a cost associated with it. The cost of a request is given by the following 
schedule: 
Ant = a. 
Units 
Requested 
Ant = b . . . . .  
1 
2 
3 
4 
Request Cost Schedule 
End minus Begin 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
30 28 26 24 22 20 18 16 14 
60 56 52 48 44 40 36 32 28 
!35 126 117 108 99 90 81 72 63 
1240 224 208 192 176 160 144 128 112 
9 IC 11 1� 13 14 
12 10 8 6 4 2 
-24 20 16 12 8 4 
54 45 36 27 18 9 
96 80 64 48 32 16 
Notice that the cost per request is higher for requests that require resources a. or 
c, is increasing in the number of units requested and decreasing in the range over which 
request can be scheduled. 
Once all requests have been sent an initial schedule is constructed by the 
scheduling algorithm. The algorithm attempts to minimize average contention over the 
resource positions and never schedules a request that is not in your veiwperiod. 
Contention occurs when a resource position is assigned to more than one participant. In 
general, if you want to reduce the probability of contention for a request you submit: 
• Request less units and/or allow for a large end minus beginning
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After a schedule is calculated, it will be displayed on your screen in the subject 
detail screen. The resource positions that have been scheduled to you are highlighted 
along with a list of all participants who have also been assigned the same resource 
position. H there is contention over resource positions, a negotiation phase will be 
conducted in which you can communicate with the other participants. The monitor will 
ask if any participant wishes to trade or withdraw from resource positions. You may 
then withdraw or trade positions you have been scheduled. H some parties come to an 
agreement the experimenter will edit the schedule to reflect the change. 
If contention still exists after the negotiation phase has ended, then an appeal 
process will begin. When the appeal phase begins an appeal screen will appear on your 
terminal. Your appeal screen will list all those resource positions at which you are still 
in contention. You must indicate your desire to appeal for the position by placing a Y 
for yes and an N for no, for each position that appeal.  It will cost you 100 francs for 
each position which you appeal for whether or not you receive the position after the 
appeal. Each participant that appeals for a position has an equal chance of being 
assigned the position. For example, if three participants are contending for resource 
position 7a and each participant appeals for the position, each has a one-third chance of 
receiving it. H you do not appeal for a position for which there is contention you will 
not be assigned that position. 
At the end of each period the program will calculate your request costs, appeal 
costs, and redemption values for you. Nonetheless, you should maintain your own 
accounting records by using the accounting form in your packet. Your earnings for the 
period are the redemption values of the resource positions assigned to you in the final 
schedule minus your request and appeal costs. 
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1 The Allocation Process 
1.1 The Auction 
The allocation process consists of an ascending price auction. You bid for 
packages of items. You must bid higher than the current standing bid for 
the package to have your bid accepted. The market will remain open for 6 
to 8 minutes. If you have the current standing bid for a package when the
market closes, you receive the package. 
1.2 The Standby Queue 
The auction will include a feature called a standby queue. You may combine 
your bids with the bids of other market participants to displace a current 
standing bid by using the standby queue. 
For example, suppose that: 
Person 1 Q.as a current standing bid of 100 francs for items al and a2.
Person 2 can place an offer on the standby queue of 60 francs for item al.
Person 3 may then combine with person 2 by making an offer of 50 francs 
for a2. Then, persons 2 and 3 jointly displace person 1. Person 2 now has a
standing bid of 60 for item al . Person 3 has a standing bid of 50 for item a2.
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1.3 Your Screen 
On your computer screen, you can see four windows like the following: 
Standby Bid Package # 
y 100 7 
# Package Status $ # Package Subject $ 
1 a8,a9 ,a10 Accepted 200 1 a3 2 50 
2 b8 ,b9,bl0 Bumped 30 2 
3 b4,b5 6 100 
Your Package # 1 
Standby # 3 
Best Price 300 
You can use the cursor to move around the screen. 
The Upper Window (Brown) allows you to enter a bid or place an offer 
on the standby queue for any package which has value to you. The first col­
umn, labelled Standby, is used to indicate whether you wish to make a bid 
for a package or to send an offer to the standby queue. The second column, 
entitled Bid, displays the amount in francs of your bid or offer. The third 
column, entitled Package #, indicates the number of the package which you 
are bidding or making an offer for. The number corresponds to the package 
# as listed in the purple window. 
The Left Window (Purple) - lists packages which have value to you. The 
first column, entitled #, lists the number of the package. The second column, 
labelled Package, lists the slots contained in the package. The third column, 
labelled Status, lists the current status of the last bid you sent to the market 
for the package. Your current status may be: 
Accepted - You have the current standing bid .  
Bumped - Someone has bid higher than you for a package that overlaps which 
your package. 
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Standby - You have entered an offer on the standby queue. 
You may also have nothing written in the status column for a particular 
package. That means that you have not sent a bid to the market for some 
time. 
The Right Upper Window (Dark Blue) - lists all outstanding offers on 
the standby queue by: 
a) items in the package.
b) identification number of the person who made the offer.
c) amount of money offered.
The first column, entitled #, gives the number of the offer. Each par­
ticipant make have up to two offers outstanding on the standby queue� The 
second column, labelled package, lists the slots in the package. The third col­
umn, entitled subject, gives the ID number of the participant who placed the 
offer. The fourth column, entitled $,  gives the amount (in francs) of the offer. 
The Lower Right Window - Allows you to combine with other offers on 
the standby queue to get a bid accepted. The first row, entitled your package 
number, indicates the package which you are bidding on, as it is listed in the 
purple window. The second row, labelled Standby #, gives the number of 
the offer on the standby queue (the dark blue window) with which you are 
combining. The third row, entitled Best Price, gives you the lowest amount 
of francs you would need to spend to receive the package specified in row 1 
if you combine with the package in row 2. 
1.4 Key Functions 
1) There are two ways to enter a bid:
a) Enter a bid and a package number in the upper window, then press
[Enter] and [Fl] at the same time. 
b) Move cursor to package in left window and press [Enter] and [Fl ]  at
the same time. This automatically sends a bid to the market for 1 0  francs 
3 8  
more than the standing bid. 
2) To make an offer on the standby queue:
Enter a Y, a bid, and a package number in the Upper Window and press 
[Enter] and [Fl] at the same time. 
3) To combine with another offer on the standby queue:
Enter your package number and the number(s) of the offer(s) on the 
standby queue with which you wish to combine in the lower right window. 
Type in the amount that you wish to bid in the row labelled best price and 
press [Enter] and [F2] at the same time to send your bid to the market. 
If you press [F4] a number will appear in the Best Price row. This is the 
least you can bid and still be able to purchase the package. You can then 
automatically send a bid to the market at the best price by pressing [Enter] 
and [F2] at the same time. 
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Table 1. Demander's Valuations: High Contention Condition 
i s E Pj Vij Pj i s E Pj Vij Pj 
1 3a 4a 5a 2450 2900 * s 3a 3b 3000 1350 
1 3b 4b 5b 1450 1450 s 4a 4b 5a Sb 3000 3000 
* 1 Ba 9a lOa 3 1 50 2000 s Ba Bb 1500 1B50 
* 1 Sb 9b lOb 2 1 50 1350 s 9a 9b lOa lOb 1500 1500
* 2 4a 5a 3200 l SOO * 6 l a 750 0 
* 2 4b Sb 2000 1200 6 2a 1000 1000 
2 Ba 9a lOa 2000 2000 6 3a 500 1 100 
2 Bb 9b lOb 1 000 13SO * 6 6a 750 0 
3 3a Ba 1 600 1 600 6 7a 1000 1 000 
3 l b 6b 1 600 1 600 6 Ba 500 500 
* 3 2b 7b 3200 1250 6 l b  750 850 
3 3b Sb 1 600 1 600 6 2b 500 750 
* 4 2a 7a 3000 2000 6 3b 250 250 
4 3a Ba 1 500 1 600 6 6 b  750 750 
* 4 l b 6b 1 750 1 600 6 7b 500 500 
4 2b 7b 1250 1250 6 Sb 250 1350 
4 3b Sb 750 1 600 
The asterisks mark the packages allocated at the optimum. The competitive 
equilibrium price of package j is given in the column laballed Pj· Pj is the sum of
the dual prices of the slots comprising the package. 
4 0  
Table 2 .  Demander's Valuations: Low Contention Condition 
i s E Pi \lij Pi 
* 1 9a lOa 4000 1000 
1 9b lOb 850 850
2 9a lOa 1000 1000 
* 2 9b lOb . 4000 850 
* 3 la 6a 3250 1600 
3 2a 7a 1000 1000 
* 3 2b 7b 2250 0 
* 4 2a 7a 3250 1000 
4 3a 8a 1000 . 1000 
* 4 lb 6b 2750 1600 
* 5 4a 5a 4b 5b 3000 0 
5 9a lOa 9b lOb 1000 . 1850 
6 la  800 800 
* 6 3a 1200 · 1000 
6 6a 800 800 
* 6 8a 1000 0 
6 lb 800 800 
* 6 3b 1000 0 
6 6b 800 800 
* 6 8b 1000 0 
The asterisks mark the packages allocated at the optimum. The Pi indicate
the competitive equilibrium prices of the packages. 
Table 3. Dual (Competitive Equilibrium) prices for all slots: High Contention 
Resou rces Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
a 0 1000 1 100 1800 0 0 1000 500 1500 0 
b 850 750 250 1200 0 750 500 13.50 0 0 
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Table 4. Dual (Competitive Equilibrium) prices for all slots: Low Contention
Resources Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
a 800 1000 1000 0 0 800 0 0 1000 0 
b 800 0 0 0 0 800 0 0 850 0 
Table 5: Initial Endowment of Tokens 
Low Contention 
Demander 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Equal Endowment 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Comp. Endowment 1000 850 1600 1800 5 1000 
High Contention 
Demander 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Equal Endowment 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Comp Endowment 1825 1 500 625 1800 675 5 
Table 6. Information about Experimental Sessions 
Exp. >lumber. Mechanism H/L Contention N um. Periods 
1 Committee H 10  
2 Committee H 9 
3 AUSM H 9 
4 AUSM H 1 1  
5 A USM/tokens H 8 (3/5) 
6 A USM/tokens H 1 1  (8/3) 
7 Committee L 8 
8 Committee L 10  
9 AUSM L 10  
10  AUSM L 10 
1 1  A USM/tokens L 9 (6/3) 
12 A USM/tokens L 12  (7 /5) 
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Table 7. Allocative Efficiencv and Cost to Users of the Three Mechanisms. 
Dependent One Period Hi con Compendow R'2 n
Variable 
Efficiency 
Committee 80.434 1 .546 -19. 100 .65 37 
(3.038) (0.515) (2.520) 
Efficiency 
A USM/Money 85.916 1 .324 -3.096 .20 40 
(3.398) (0.486) (2.634) 
Efficiency 
A USM/Tokens 80.317 1 .035 6 .216 0.400 . 14  40 
(5.815 )  (0.636) (3.328) (2 .63) 
User Cost 
Committee 6. 23 -0. 702 . 5 .94 .44 37 
(1 .36 )  (0.255 )  (1 .30) 
User Cost 
A USM/Money 16.20 1 .54 2 1 . 10  .55 40 
(4.45 ) (0. 731 )  (3.65) 
( ) are standard errors.
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Table 8. Efficiency and User Surplus: Committee Process 
Ll  LlO  Hl  HlO 
Effie. 81 . 98 (  16.44 )  95. 89(71 . 06)  62.88 (1 .21) 76. 79(25. 77) 
Cost .5 . . 53 -0 .79 11 .47 5 . 15 
Users' Surplus i6A.5 ( 1 1 . 84 ) 96.68 (71 . 06)  51 .41 (0) 71 .64(10. 1 )  
Table 9. Efficiency and User Surplus: AUSM/Money
Ll LlO Hl  H lO 
Effie. 87.24 (26.54) 99. 1 6(71 .06) 84. 14(54 .75) 96.06(95.09) 
Cost 1 7. 74 31 . 60 38.84 52.70 
Users ' Surplus 69.50( 1 . 8 1 )  67.56(1 .47) 45.30(0) 43.36(0) 
Table 10 .  Efficiency and User Surplus: AUSM/tokens/the Equal 
Endowment Condition 
Ll  LlO Hl  HlO  
Effie. 81 .35( 16 .44) 90.67(57.25) 87.56(72. 71 )  96.88 (95.09) 
Cost 0 0 0 0 
Users · Surplus 8 1 . :3.5 (  1 6 .44 ) 90.67(.57.25) 87.56(72. 71 ) 96.88 (95.09) 
Table 1 1 .  The Effect of the Two Endowments on the 
Variance of Payoffs Across Subjects 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-stat 
one 3404260 788676 4.316 
per - 167333 112328 -1 .490 
.hi con .712256 . . .. 600223 1.187 
eompendow 27.54 1 5  648072 0.425 
R2 = . 08 .  n = 40.
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Table 12. Allocated Packages Under AUSM/Tokens Under Both
Endowments: High Contention Condition 
i s E Pj Vij E.E. C.E. i s E Pj VH 
1 3a 4a 5a 2450 0 0 •5 3a 3b 3000 
1 3b 4b 5b 1450 0 0 5 4a 4b 5a 5b 3000 
* 1 Ba 9a lOa 3150 100 100 5 Ba Bb 1500 
* 1 Bb 9b I Ob 2150 91 100 5 9a 9b lOa !Ob 1500 
* 2 4a 5a 3200 91 100 *6 la 750 
* 2 4b 5b 2000 91 100 6 2a 1000 
2 Ba 9a IO a 2000 0 0 6 3a 500 
2 8b 9b !Ob 1000 9 0 •6 6a 750 
3 3a Ba 1600 0 0 6 7a 1000 
3 lb 6b 1600 9 25 6 Ba 500 
* 3 2b 7b 3200 64 50 6 lb 750 
3 3b Bb 1600 0 0 6 2b 500 
* 4 2a 7a 3000 82 100 6 3b 250 
4 3a Ba 1500 0 0 6 6b 750 
* 4 lb 6b 1750 55 75 6 7b 500 
4 2b 7b 1250 27 50 6 Bb 250 
4 3b Bb 750 0 0 
E.E.=3 of periods in which this package was received in the Equal Endowment
treatment. 
C.E.=3 of periods in which this package was received in the Competitive Endow­
ment treatment. 
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E.E. C.E. 
100 100 
9 0 
0 0 
0 0 
100 100 
lB 0 
0 0 
100 100 
lB 0 
0 0 
36 0 
9 0 
0 0 
36 0 
9 0 
0 0 
Table 13. Allocated Packages Under AUSM/Tokens Under Both 
R i rlowments· T .nw Cor t.ent.inr ("!nn rt "tion 
i s E Pi \tij E.E. C.E.
*l  9a lOa 4000 85 88 
1 9b lOb 850 8 25 
2 9a lOa 1000 8 12 
*2 9b lOb 4000 85 75 
*3 la 6a 3250 85 100 
3 2a 7a 1000 23 12 
*3 2b 7b 2250 100 100 
*4 2a 7a 3250 77 88 
4 3a 8a 1000 15 25 
*4 lb 6b 2750 38 50 
*5 4a 5a 4b 5b 3000 100 100
5 9a lOa 9b lOb 1000 8 0 
6 la 800 15 37 
*6 3a 1200 85 . 75 
6 6a 800 15 0 
*6 Sa 1000 85 75 
6 lb 800 62 50 
*6 3b 1000 100 100 
6 6b 800 62 50 
*6 8b 1000 100 100 
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Figure 1. JPL Resource Allocation Negotiation Process 
Forecast Inputs 
Detailed User Inputs 
Viewperiods 
t---.,.1 Generate New 
Allocation 
Update Midrange 
Allocation Data Base 
---------� User Review and 
Update Data Base 
Higher Level 
Conflict Resolution 
Project Managers 
Meeting 
Flight Operations 
Managers Meeting 
Yes 
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Proposal Preparation 
User Negotiation 
Meetings 
User Changes 
Update Data Base 
Yes 
DSN Transfer 
Short Range 
1--� Allocation Plan 
(Ei ht Week) 
Figure 2 .  Commodity to be Allocated (20 slots) 
Resources Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
a 
b 
Figure 3.  Users (6) 
User # 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Type c c p p A M 
View period 1 1 2 2 1 2 
C=contiguous, P=periodic, A=array, M=maintenance 
viewperiod 1 => usable slots E columns 3,4,5,8,9, 10  
viewperiod 2 => usable slots E columns 1 ,2,3,6,7,8 
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Eff % Fre 
E: 60-65 
E:65-70 
E:70-75 
E:75-80 
E:B0-85 
E:85-90 
E:90-95 
E:95-99 
Eff = 1 00 
More 
Figure 4: Efficiency of Allocations of the Random Algorithm: High 
Contention Parameters 
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Figure .j ; Efficiency of Allocations of the Random Algorithm: Low
Contention Parameters 
: Frequency1 
0 1  
9 1  
1 07 1 
1 75 i  
78 1 
269 1 
806 i 
1 32 !  
9241 
0 1  
50 
References 
Banks, J .S . ,  J .O .  Ledyard, and D .P. Porter ( 1989) .  "Allocating uncertain 
and unresponsive resources: an experimental approach," RAND Jour­
nal of Economics, 20: 1-25. 
Grether, D .M. ,  R.M. Isaac, and C.R. Plott ( 198 1 ) .  "The allocation of land­
ing rights by unanimity among competitors,"  American Economic Re­
view Proceedings, 71: 166-171. 
Koopmans, T.C. and M.J. Beckman (1957) .  "Assignment Problems and 
the Location of Economic Activities," Econometrica, 25:53-76. 
Ledyard, John ( 1993) . "The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Or­
ganizational Computing," Journal of Organizational Computing, 3(1 ) ,  
pp. 121-134. 
Ledyard, John ( 1994) .  "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Re­
search," Social Science Working Paper No. 861,  California Institute 
of Technology. To appear in Handbook of Experimental Economics, 
edited by A. Roth and J .  Kagel, Princeton University Press. 
Olson, Mark ( 1991 ) .  "Dominant and Nash Strategy Mechanisms for the As­
signment Problem,!! Social Science \Vorking Paper No. 770, California 
Institute of Technology. 
Olson , M. and D. Porter (1991) .  "A Deep Space Resource Allocation 
Primer," California Institute of Technology mimeo. 
Olson, M. and D. Porter (1994) . "An experimental examination into the 
design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with 
and without money," Economic Theory, 4 :1 1-40. 
Ostrom, Elinor ( 1990) . "Governing the Commons," Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Papai, S. (1994) . "Assignment by Design," mimeo, California Institute of 
Technology. 
5 1  
Riker, VV.H. and I. Sened ( 1991 ) .  "A Political Theory of the Origin of 
Property Rights: Airport Slots," American Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 35, No. 4: 95 1-969. 
Sened, I. a.nd W.H. Riker ( 1992) .  "Common Property and Private Property: 
The Case of Air Slots , "  mimeo, Tel Aviv University, November 1992. 
Smith, V. (1976) . "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory," 
American Economic Review, 66:274-279. 
5 2  
